As more aspects of social interaction are digitally recorded, there is a growing need to develop privacy-preserving data analysis methods. Social scientists will be more likely to adopt these methods if doing so entails minimal change to their current methodology. Toward that end, we present a general and modular method for privatizing Bayesian inference for Poisson factorization, a broad class of models that contains some of the most widely used models in the social sciences. Our method satisfies local differential privacy, which ensures that no single centralized server need ever store the non-privatized data. To formulate our local-privacy guarantees, we introduce and focus on limited-precision local privacy-the local privacy analog of limited-precision differential privacy (Flood et al., 2013) . We present two case studies, one involving social networks and one involving text corpora, that test our method's ability to form the posterior distribution over latent variables under different levels of noise, and demonstrate our method's utility over a naïve approach, wherein inference proceeds as usual, treating the privatized data as if it were not privatized.
Introduction
Data from social processes often take the form of discrete observations (e.g., edges in a social network, word tokens in an email). These observations may contain sensitive information Figure 1: Topic recovery: our method vs. the naïve approach. (a) We generated the non-privatized data synthetically so that the true topics were known. We then privatized the data using (b) a low noise level and (c) a high noise level. The heatmap in each subfigure visualizes the data, using red to denote positive counts and blue to denote negative counts. With a high noise level, the naïve approach overfits the noise and therefore fails to recover the true topics. We describe this experiment in more detail in Section 6.2. about the people involved. As more aspects of social interaction are digitally recorded, the opportunities for social scientific insights grow; however, so too does the risk of unacceptable privacy violations. As a result, there is a growing need to develop privacy-preserving data analysis methods. In practice, social scientists will be more likely to adopt these methods if doing so entails minimal change to their current methodology.
Toward that end, we present a method for privatizing Bayesian inference for Poisson factorization (Titsias, 2008; Cemgil, 2009; Zhou and Carin, 2012; Gopalan and Blei, 2013; Paisley et al., 2014) , a broad class of models for learning latent structure from discrete data. This class contains many of the most widely used models in the social sciences, including topic models for text corpora (Blei et al., 2003; Buntine and Jakulin, 2004; Canny, 2004) , population models for genetic data (Pritchard et al., 2000) , stochastic block models for social networks (Ball et al., 2011; Gopalan and Blei, 2013; Zhou, 2015) , and tensor factorization for dyadic data (Welling and Weber, 2001; Chi and Kolda, 2012; Schmidt and Morup, 2013; Schein et al., 2015 Schein et al., , 2016b . It further includes deep hierarchical models , dynamic models Acharya et al., 2015; Schein et al., 2016a) , and many others.
To provide practical guarantees, our method applies principles of differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006) applied to data locally, before they are aggregated into a full matrix for factorization. Our method is general and modular, allowing social scientists to build on (instead of replace) their existing derivations and implementations of non-private Poisson factorization. To derive our method, we rely on a novel reinterpretation of the geometric mechanism (Ghosh et al., 2012) , as well as a previously unknown general relationship between the Skellam (Skellam, 1946) , Bessel (Yuan and Kalbfleisch, 2000) , and Poisson distributions; we note that these new results may be of independent interest in other contexts.
Our method satisfies a strong variant of differential privacy-i.e., local privacy-under which the sensitive data is privatized (or noised) via a randomized response method before inference. This ensures that no single centralized server need ever store the non-privatized data-a condition that is non-negotiable in many real-world settings. The key challenge introduced by local privacy is how to infer the latent variables (including model parameters) given the privatized data. One option is a naïve approach, wherein inference proceeds as usual, treating the privatized data as if it were not privatized. In the context of maximum likelihood estimation, the naïve approach has been shown to exhibit pathologies when observations are discrete or count-valued; researchers have therefore advocated for treating the non-privatized observations as latent variables to be inferred (Yang et al., 2012; Karwa et al., 2014; Bernstein et al., 2017) . We embrace this approach and extend it to Bayesian inference, where our aim is to form the posterior distribution over the latent variables conditioned on the privatized data and the randomized response method. We use an MCMCbased method that asymptotically converges to sampling from the joint posterior of the Poisson factorization model and privacy variables. We also introduce several approaches to speed up inference of the posterior with negligible difference in the inferred model.
We present two case studies applying our method to 1) overlapping community detection in social networks and 2) topic modeling for text corpora. In order to formulate our localprivacy guarantees, we introduce and focus on limited-precision local privacy-the local privacy analog of limited-precision differential privacy, originally proposed by Flood et al. (2013) . For each case study, we report a suite of experiments that test our method's ability to form the posterior distribution over latent variables under different levels of noise. These experiments also demonstrate the utility of our method over the naïve approach for both case studies; we provide an illustrative example in Figure 1 .
Background and problem formulation
Differential privacy. Differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006 ) is a rigorous privacy criterion that guarantees that no single observation in a data set will have a significant influence on the information obtained by analyzing that data set.
Definition 1 A randomized algorithm A(·) satisfies -differential privacy if for all pairs of neighboring data sets Y and Y that differ in only a single observation
for all subsets S in the range of A(·).
The meaning of "a single observation" in Definition 1 depends on the application and the researcher's privacy goals. Different choices of this can have dramatic effects on what kinds of neighboring data sets must be accommodated to ensure differential privacy. For example, consider the application of social network analysis wherein the matrix Y represents a social network, with y ij representing the total count of interactions sent from sender i to recipient j. A researcher could define the unit of privacy-i.e., what "a single observation" means-as one interaction from i to j. In this case, the only difference between Y and a neighboring data set Y would be at a single element-e.g., y ij where |y ij −y ij | = 1. Alternatively, a researcher could define the unit of privacy to be the history of interactions between a certain sender and recipient. In this case, a neighboring data set Y would again differ at a single element-e.g. y ij -but this time by a variable amount |y ij −y ij | ≤ N (max) where N (max) is the maximum possible difference between two counts in the data set.
Local differential privacy. We focus on local differential privacy, which we refer to as local privacy. Under this criterion, the observations remain private from even the data analysis algorithm. The algorithm only sees privatized versions of the observations, often constructed by adding noise from specific distributions. The process of adding noise is known as randomized response-a reference to survey-sampling methods originally developed in the social sciences prior to the development of differential privacy Warner (1965) . Satisfying this criterion implies that one should never need to aggregate true observations of the data in a single location, as the noise addition process for a portion of the data will be independent of the other data.
for all subsets S in the range of R(·). If a data analysis algorithm sees only the observations' -private responses, then the data analysis itself satisfies -local privacy.
In some domains, N (max) cannot be known in a locally private sense; to know the maximum difference between two entries in the Y matrix described above requires having access to all of the other data in the matrix, which cannot be afforded. In this sense, true local privacy is impossible to achieve for unbounded count data. Even when known, for unbounded sparse counts, the maximum difference N (max) may be orders of magnitude larger than the average difference, such that the magnitude of the noise is larger on average than that of the data.
Limited-precision local privacy. Definition 2 requires that condition 2 hold for all pairs of observations y, y ∈ Y. In practice, this is notoriously difficult to achieve when Y is extremely large, meaning that any pair of observations may be arbitrarily different, as is often the case with data from social processes. We therefore introduce and focus on limitedprecision local privacy-the local privacy analog of limited-precision differential privacy, originally proposed by Flood et al. (2013) and subsequently used to privatize analyses of geographic location data (Andrés et al., 2013) and financial network data (Papadimitriou et al., 2017) .
Definition 3 If N is a positive integer, then a randomized response method R(·) is (N, )private if for all pairs of observations y, y ∈ Y such that y − y 1 ≤ N
for all subsets S in the range of R(·). If a data analysis algorithm sees only the observations' (N, )-private responses, then the data analysis itself satisfies (N, )-limited-precision local privacy. If y 1 ≤ N for all y ∈ Y, then (N, )-limited-precision local privacy implies -local privacy.
Limited-precision local privacy can be thought of as a generalization of local privacy that allows the unit of privacy to include multiples of natural units of the observed data. Consider again Y , a network of message counts organized by sender and recipient, where we are interested in adding privacy to how much each pair of individuals interacts. Under local privacy, if the unit of privacy is a single message, then it is possible to add relatively little noise to the data to satisfy local privacy under the assumption N (max) = 1. However, information about any relationship with more than one message is likely to be shown. In the condition where one treats a full message history y ij as an observation, N (max) will likely be equal to the largest entry in Y (as many entries are expected to be zero). In a social network, this may be an extreme outlier, and adding noise proportional to this value will completely overwhelm all normal interactions in the data set. Limited-precision local privacy allows a compromise: by setting e.g. N = 3 while considering a full relationship history as a message, we can make a specific guarantee that if actors i and j interacted 3 or fewer times, it will be statistically challenging to distinguish their relationship from other pairs that never interacted at all. This can be particularly useful in settings where the existence of an observation in a data set alone is not necessary to keep private, but specific sub-parts of that observation (e.g. a sensitive message thread with an HR representative, or a sentence in an email mentioning a secret project) may need to be private.
Geometric mechanism. There are several standard randomized response methods in the differential privacy toolbox, many of which involve adding independently generated noise to each element of each observation. Unfortunately, the most commonly used noise mechanisms-the Gaussian and Laplace mechanisms-are poor choices for count data because they generate real-valued noise. We therefore focus on the geometric mechanism (Ghosh et al., 2012) , which can be viewed as the discrete analog of the Laplace mechanism. The geometric mechanism adds noise drawn from a two-sided geometric distribution to each element of each observation. A two-sided geometric random variable τ ∼ 2Geo(α) is an integer τ ∈ Z. The PMF for the two-sided geometric distribution is as follows:
Theorem 4 (Proof in Appendix B) If N is a positive integer and randomized response method R(·) is the geometric mechanism with parameter α, then for any pair of observations y, y ∈ Y such that y − y 1 ≤ N , R(·) satisfies P (R(y) ∈ S) ≤ e P R(y ) ∈ S
for all subsets S in the range of R(·), where
Therefore, the geometric mechanism with parameter α is an (N, )-private randomized response method with = N ln ( 1 α ). If a data analysis algorithm sees only the observations' (N, )-private responses, then the data analysis itself satisfies (N, )-limited precision local privacy.
Differentially Private Bayesian inference. In Bayesian statistics, we begin with a probabilistic model M that relates observable variables Y to latent variables Z via a joint distribution P M (Y, Z). The goal of inference is then to compute the posterior distribution P M (Z | Y ) over the latent variables conditioned on observed values of Y . The posterior is almost always analytically intractable and thus inference involves approximating it. The two most common methods of approximate Bayesian inference are variational inference, wherein we fit the parameters of an approximating distribution Q(Z | Y ), and Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC), wherein we approximate the posterior with a finite set of samples {Z (s) } S s=1 generated via a Markov chain whose stationary distribution is the exact posterior. We can conceptualize each of these methods as a randomized algorithm A(·) that returns an approximation to the posterior distribution P M (Z | Y ); in general A(·) does not satisfydifferential privacy. However, if A(·) is an MCMC algorithm that returns a single sample from the posterior, it guarantees privacy (Dimitrakakis et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2015; Dimitrakakis et al., 2017) . Adding noise to posterior samples can also guarantee privacy (Zhang et al., 2016) , though this set of noised samples {Z (s) } S s=1 collectively approximate some distributionP M (Z | Y ) that depends on and is different than the exact posterior (but close, in some sense, and equal when → 0). For specific models, we can also noise the transition kernel of the MCMC algorithm to construct a Markov chain whose stationary distribution is again not the exact posterior, but something close that guarantees privacy . We can also take an analogous approach to privatize variational inference, wherein we add noise to the sufficient statistics computed in each iteration (Park et al., 2016) .
Locally private Bayesian inference. We first formalize the general objective of Bayesian inference under local privacy. Given a generative model M for non-privatized data Y and latent variables Z with joint distribution P M (Y, Z), we further assume a randomized response method R(·) that generates privatized data sets:Ỹ ∼ P R (Ỹ | Y ). The aim of Bayesian inference is then to form the following posterior:
This distribution correctly characterizes our uncertainty about the latent variables Z, conditioned on all of our observations and assumptions-i.e., the privatized dataỸ , the model M, and the randomized response method R. The expansion in Equation 7 shows that this posterior implicitly treats the non-privatized data Y as a latent variable and marginalizes over it using the mixing distribution P R (Y |Ỹ ) which is itself a posterior that characterizes our uncertainty about Y givenỸ and the randomized response method. The key observation here is that if we can generate samples from P R (Y |Ỹ ), we can use them to approximate the expectation in Equation 7, assuming that we already have a method for approximating the non-private posterior P M (Z | Y ). In the context of MCMC, alternating between sampling values of the non-privatized data from its complete conditional-i.e., Y (s) ∼ P M,R (Y | Z (s−1) ,Ỹ )-and sampling values of the latent variables-i.e., Z (s) ∼ P M (Z | Y (s) )-constitutes a Markov chain whose stationary distribution is P M,R (Z, Y |Ỹ ). In scenarios where we already have derivations and implementations for sampling from P M (Z | Y ), we need only be able to sample efficiently from P M,R (Y | Z,Ỹ ) in order to obtain a locally private Bayesian inference algorithm; whether we can do this depends heavily on our assumptions about M and R. We note that the objective of Bayesian inference under local privacy, as defined in Equation 7, is similar to that of Williams and McSherry (2010) , who identify their key barrier to inference as being unable to analytically form the marginal likelihood that links the privatized data to Z:
In the next sections, we show that if M is a Poisson factorization model and R is the geometric mechanism, then we can analytically form this marginal likelihood and derive an efficient MCMC algorithm that is asymptotically guaranteed to generate samples from the posterior in Equation 7.
Locally private Poisson factorization
Poisson factorization. We assume that Y is a count-valued data set. We further assume that each count y n ∈ Z + in this data set is an independent Poisson random variable y n ∼ Pois(µ n ), where the count's latent rate parameter µ n is a function of the latent variables Z. This class of models is known as Poisson factorization and, as described in Section 1, includes many widely used models in social science. For example, the mixed-membership stochastic block model for social networks (Ball et al., 2011; Gopalan and Blei, 2013; Zhou, 2015) corresponds to the case where Y is a V × V count matrix; n = (i, j), where i, j ∈ [V ]; Z = {Θ, Π}; Θ and Π are V × C and C × C non-negative, real-valued matrices, respectively; and µ ij = C c=1 C d=1 θ ic θ jd π cd . Similarly, latent Dirichlet allocation (Blei et al., 2003 )-a well-known topic model for text corpora-corresponds to the case where Y is a D × V count matrix; n = (d, v), where d ∈ [D] and v ∈ [V ]; Z = {Θ, Φ}, where Θ and Φ are D × K and K × V non-negative, real-valued matrices, respectively; and µ dv = K k=1 θ dk φ kv . In both cases, it is standard to assume independent gamma priors over the elements of the latent matrices that comprise Z; doing so facilitates efficient Bayesian inference of these matrices via gamma-Poisson conjugacy (when conditioned on Y ).
Geometric mechanism. We focus on the geometric mechanism (Ghosh et al., 2012) because it is a natural choice for count data. By reinterpreting the geometric mechanism as involving Skellam noise and deriving a general relationship between the Skellam, Bessel, and Poisson distributions, we are able to obtain analytic tractability and efficient Bayesian inference while also maintaining local privacy guarantees. In particular, we show that augmenting our model with auxiliary variables λ n = (λ (+) n , λ (−) n ) allows us to analytically form the marginal likelihood P M,R (ỹ n | µ n , λ n ) and sample efficiently from P M,R (y n |ỹ n , µ n , λ n ), as desired.
Each non-privatized count y n is generated by our model M-i.e., y n ∼ Pois(µ n )-and then privatized as follows:
We use sign superscripts (±) to describe the noise added to the data. While the true data y n must be non-negative,ỹ (+) ∈ Z may be non-negative or negative.
Theorem 5 (Proof in Appendix C) A two-sided geometric random variable τ ∼ 2Geo(α) can be generated as follows:
n Process 3
for s ∈ {+, −} :
where the Skellam distribution is the marginal distribution over the difference τ := g (+) −g (−) of two independent Poisson random variables g (+) ∼ Pois(λ (+) ) and g (−) ∼ Pois(λ (−) ).
Via Theorem 5, we can express the generative process forỹ (±) n in three equivalent ways, shown in Figure 2 , each of which provides a unique and necessary insight. The first way (process 1) is useful for showing that our MCMC algorithm guarantees privacy, since two-sided geometric noise is an existing privacy mechanism. The second way (process 2) represents the two-sided geometric noise in terms of a pair of Poisson random variables with exponentially distributed rates; in so doing, it reveals the auxiliary variables that facilitate inference. The third way (process 3) marginalizes out all three Poisson random variables (including y n ), so thatỹ (±) n is directly drawn from a Skellam distribution, which also happens to be the desired marginal likelihood P M,R (ỹ n | µ n , λ n ) under the geometric mechanism. To derive the second and third ways, we use Theorem 5, the definition of the Skellam distribution, and the additive property of two or more Poisson random variables.
MCMC algorithm
As explained in Section 2, to obtain an locally private MCMC algorithm, we need to be able to draw samples of the latent variables given the privatized data. We already have a method to draw samples of the latent variables given the non-private data in the form of any existing non-private Poisson factorization model. We now rely on a previously unknown general relationship between the Skellam, Bessel, and Poisson distributions to derive an efficient way to draw samples from P M,R (y n |ỹ n , µ n , λ n ). This relationship is compatible with a sampling procedure for the noise priors λ n using a Gamma distribution. These pieces are all we need to obtain a complete locally private MCMC algorithm. The input to this MCMC algorithm is the privatized data setỸ (±) .
Theorem 6 (Proof in Appendix D) Consider two Poisson random variables y 1 ∼ Pois(λ (+) ) and y 2 ∼ Pois(λ (−) ). Their minimum m := min{y 1 , y 2 } and their difference δ := y 1 − y 2 are deterministic functions of y 1 and y 2 . However, if not conditioned on y 1 and y 2 , the random variables m and δ can be marginally generated as follows:
Yuan and Kalbfleisch (2000) give details of the Bessel distribution, which can be sampled efficiently (Devroye, 2002) . 1 Theorem 6 means that we can generate two independent Poisson random variables by first generating their difference δ and then their minimum m. Because δ = y 1 − y 2 , if δ is positive, then y 2 must be the minimum and thus y 1 = δ − m. In practice, this means that if we only get to observe the difference of two Poisson-distributed counts, we can still "recover" the counts by drawing a Bessel random variable.
Assuming thatỹ
n ) via Theorem 5, we can representỹ (±) n explicitly as the difference between two latent non-negative counts:ỹ
n , or the intermediate estimate of y n with only the positive side of the two-sided geometric noise added. We can then define the minimum of these latent counts to be m n = min{ỹ
n }. Given randomly initialized latent variables, we can then sample a value of m n from its conditional posterior, which is a Bessel distribution:
Using this value, we can then computeỹ (+) n and g (−) n :
Becauseỹ (+) n is the sum of y n and g (+)
n -two independent Poisson random variables-we can then sample y n from its conditional posterior, which is a binomial distribution:
Equations 12 through 15 constitute a way to draw samples from P M,R (y n |ỹ n , µ n , λ n ). Given a sampled Y , we can then draw samples of the latent variables from their conditional posteriors, which are the same as in non-private Poisson factorization. Finally, we can also sample λ
Equation 16 follows from gamma-Poisson conjugacy and the fact that the exponential prior over λ (s) n can be expressed as a gamma prior with shape parameter equal to one-i.e., λ (s) n ∼ Γ(1, α 1−α ). Equations 12-16, along with the conditional posteriors for the latent variables, define an MCMC algorithm that is asymptotically guaranteed to generate samples from P M,R (Z |Ỹ (±) ) as desired.
1. We have released our implementation of Bessel sampling at https://github.com/aschein/fatwalrus.
It is the only open-source version of which we are aware.
Performance considerations
An advantage of our method is that it can be implemented as a simple augmentation of pre-existing code for MCMC inference of a non-private Poisson factorization model. However, the inference itself has performance problems in scaling to larger data matrices. We identify three primary reasons for this. For each, we provide a practical modification of the algorithm to reduce the time required for inference. We also offer empirical evidence of these modifications' efficacy in practice.
Scheduling parameter updates (Schedule). First, though our method's sampling procedure for the random noise variables converges to samples from the posterior, it does not guarantee stability among those samples. From a privacy perspective, this is ideal: the goal is not to reverse the addition of noise to individual entries, but to statistically account for this noise in the inference of our more general model parameters. However, the high variance among samples of the estimated true count data is sufficiently high in practice that it may interfere with inference of the Poisson factorization model parameters. In Process 3 in Figure 2 , we show these are downstream in the inference procedure from the noise variables.
To allow these parameters to converge, we offer an alternative schedule of resampling the parameters λ (s) n and latent variables g
n at a much slower rate than the Poisson latent variables and parameters. We find that updating these variables once per 100 iterations of sampling of the Poisson factorization parameters produced strong results. As the inferred noise variables are also the most expensive to resample, we find that this greatly reduces the running time. This strategy also retains our guarantee of asymptotic convergence of MCMC.
Approximating Bessel samples with iterated conditional modes (ICM). As mentioned earlier in this section, the sampling procedure to infer the added two-sided geometric noise is slow. This is due in particular to the expense of sampling m from the Bessel distribution. Though it is possible to sample from a Bessel distribution efficiently without computing Bessel functions or ratios (Devroye, 2002) , it still requires an iterative process that is considerably more time-consuming than that of the other distributions involved in inference. An alternate approach, motivated by the method of iterated conditional models (ICM) Besag (1986) , is simply to estimate the value of m as the mode of that Bessel. At each sampling step, we set m as the mode of the Bessel according to its formulation in Devroye (2002) , with the parameters ν n = |ỹ (±) n | and a n = 2 (λ
conditioned on the observed data and the other current samples of variables and parameters:
In practice, we find the mode is often the highest integer less than the mean of the distribution, providing only a small negative bias in the expectation of m.
Hybrid noise inference (Hybrid). A final problem in sampling comes from the density of the noise parameter space. Typically, inference of Poisson factorization models benefits from sparse observation matrices; updates to parameters can be computed by iterating through only the nonzero entries in the data. However, in our method, we cannot assume that any observed zero (i.e., a count that is zero with private noise added) is actually a zero. As a result, we must store and compute samples densely for the noise proportional to the total size of the observed data. For data sets with large dimensions, inference over the dense noisy data observation matrix can be slow and space-intensive. Some of this slowness may be remedied through simple parallelization; each count in the data matrix has its private noise generated independently of the other counts in the matrix, so resampling of these variables may occur in any order or simultaneously without additional coordination. However, that scales only roughly linearly with the number of processors available. An option to somewhat reduce this load is to reduce noise inference only to entries whose observed value is above a certain threshold. Motivated by the concept of "heavy hitters" in networks, this strategy aims to focus the resources of reconstruction on the entries large enough that, even with noise added, we have some reliable notion of their magnitude. In some applications, these entries are the ones that are most interesting to model correctly. For the remaining entries, we perform inference na ively. In our experiments below, we set the threshold at 0, such that any count observed to be 0 or less after noise is treated as a "true" data observation by our model. We only infer λ (s) n and g (s) n for positive observed counts, with the possibility that inference may lead to estimates of those true counts as zero. As the choice of which noise variables to infer is conditioned on the observed data and not estimates of the private data, we can initialize only these noise variables at the start of inference. Figure 3 shows the relative performance improvements of each of these methods. We evaluate the mean relative error of the estimated matrix of Poisson priors with respect to the true observed data using 25 synthetic social network data matrices, each generated synthetically using the generative process for a Bayesian mixed-membership stochastic block model for overlapping community detection (Ball et al., 2011; Gopalan and Blei, 2013; . The model data are generated with 100 agents and 5 latent communities using a Gamma shape and rate prior of α = 0.1 and β = 1, respectively. We evaluate our inference code with parallelization disabled to obtain a clearer sense of the timing. We find that applying the Schedule approach converge at both a clock time and iteration rate indistinguishable from the naïve model performing no inference of noise. In addition, we Figure 4 : Block structure recovery: our method vs. the naïve approach. We generated the non-privatized data synthetically. We then privatized the data using three different levels of noise. The top row depicts the data, using red to denote positive counts and blue to denote negative counts. As the noise level increases, the naïve approach overfits the noise and fails to recover the true µ ij values, predicting high values even for sparse parts of the matrix. In contrast, our method recovers the latent structure, even for high noise levels.
find that while the ICM and Hybrid strategies sometimes take longer to converge after reaching a local optimum, the convergence behavior is not affected by composing with the Schedule approach. We therefore suggest that default implementations use the Schedule approach, with the possibility of applying ICM for large input matrices or Hybrid for very sparse input data if further performance improvements are necessary.
Case studies
We now present two case studies applying our method to 1) overlapping community detection in social networks and 2) topic modeling for text corpora. For each case study, we formulate local-privacy guarantees and ground them in illustrative examples. We then report a suite of experiments that test our method's ability to form the posterior distribution over latent variables for different types of data under different levels of noise. We focus on synthetic and semi-synthetic data to control for the effects of model mismatch (i.e., non-Poisson observations); although model mismatch is an important problem, it is outside the scope of this paper. Using synthetic and semi-synthetic data also allows us to vary high-level properties of the data (e.g., scale or sparsity).
Reference methods. We compare the performance of our method to two references methods: 1) non-private Poisson factorization on the non-privatized data and 2) non-private Poisson factorization on the privatized data-i.e., the naïve approach, wherein inference proceeds as usual, treating the privatized data as if it were not privatized. 2 Throughout our experiments, we use MCMC for both reference methods.
Performance measure. Ideally, we would directly compare our method's posterior distribution and the naïve approach's posterior distribution to that of non-private Poisson factorization on the non-privatized data. Unfortunately, all three posteriors are analytically intractable. However, because we use MCMC to approximate each posterior with a finite set of samples of the latent variables, we can instead form the expected value of µ n with respect to each one-e.g.,μ
With synthetic and semi-synthetic data, we can use an aggregate loss function to compare the expected values to the values used to generate the data: 1 N N n=1 (μ n , µ * n ), where µ * n is the "true" value. We define (μ n , µ n ) to be the KL divergence of the Poisson distribution implied byμ n from the Poisson distribution implied by µ n . Comparing the value of this aggregate loss function for our method and the value for naïve approach to the value for non-private Poisson factorization provides a proxy for measuring the divergence of their posterior distributions from that of non-private Poisson factorization.
Our goal is to evaluate these models for applications to social science. In these cases, we are interested in not only the distance between the inferred prior under our method and the true method, but also whether the inferred model is interpretable. Topic models for text data have a large literature on evaluating interpretability, from which we use the topic coherence (Mimno et al., 2011) and NPMI (Bouma, 2009; Lau et al., 2014) metrics. However, existing metrics for intrinsic network quality either rely on metadata reflecting some of the community structure of interest, such as BESTest (Peel et al., 2017) or assume that inter-community interaction is a negative feature of a network, such as conductance (Chung, 1996) and modularity (Newman, 2006) . We offer an alternative evaluation in the form of pairwise embedding difference, which measures how close the observed pairwise similarities of actors in the observed latent community space is to the similarities found from a non-private inference process:
Definition 7 Consider a data set of V elements embedded in latent space θ of dimension K, where each embedding is a stochastic vector over the latent space:
∀v. θ v 1 = 1.
We can compute the distances between elements in this space by considering the outer product of a normalized version of θ with itself:
We define the pairwise embedding distance between two such embeddings θ and θ to be the mean average distance between the two distance matrices D θ and D θ :
2. The naïve approach first truncates negative counts to zero and thus uses the truncated geometric mechanism (Ghosh et al., 2012) .
Case study 1: Overlapping community detection
Organizations often want to know whether their employees are interacting as efficiently and productively as possible. For example, are there missing connections between employees that, if present, would significantly reduce duplication of effort? Do the natural "communities" that emerge from digitally recorded employee interactions match up with the formal organizational structure? To answer these and other questions, many organizations want to partner with social scientists in order to gain actionable insights based on their employees' interactions. However, sharing such interaction data increases the risk of privacy violations. Moreover, standard anonymization procedures can be reverse-engineered adversarially and thus do not provide privacy guarantees (Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2009) . In contrast, the formal privacy guarantees provided by differential privacy may be sufficient for employees to consent to sharing their data.
Limited-precision local privacy. In this scenario, data set Y is a V × V count matrix,
where each element y ij ∈ Z + in this matrix is the number of interactions from actor i ∈ V to actor j ∈ [V ]. A single observation in this data set is a single element. Via Theorem 4, y
ij := y ij + τ ij , where τ ij ∼ 2Geo(α), is (N, )-private, where N is the precision level and = N ln 1 α . Informally, this means that if the difference between two observations is N or less, then their privatized versions will be indistinguishable, provided is sufficiently small. Furthermore, if y ij ≤ N , then its privatized version will be indistinguishable from the privatized version of y ij = 0. For example, if i interacted with j three times (i.e., y ij = 3) and N = 3, then an adversary would be unable to tell fromỹ (±) ij whether i had interacted with j at all, provided is sufficiently small. We note that if y ij N , then an adversary would be able to tell that i had interacted with j, though not the exact number of times.
Poisson factorization. As explained in Section 3, the mixed-membership stochastic block model for learning latent overlapping community structure in social networks (Ball et al., 2011; Gopalan and Blei, 2013; Zhou, 2015) is a special case of Poisson factorization where Y is a V × V count matrix; n = (i, j), where i, j ∈ [V ]; Z = {Θ, Π}; Θ and Π are V × C and C × C nonnegative, real-valued matrices, respectively; and µ ij = C c=1 C d=1 θ ic θ jd π cd . The factors θ ic and θ jd represent how much actors i and j participate in communities c and d, respectively, while the factor π cd represents how much actors in community c interact with actors in community d. It is standard to assume independent gamma priors over the factors-i.e., θ ic , π cd ∼ Gamma(a 0 , b 0 ), where a 0 and b 0 are shape and rate hyperparameters, respectively.
Synthetic data. We generated social networks of V = 20 actors with C = 5 communities. We randomly generated the true parameters θ * ic , π * cd ∼ Γ(a 0 , b 0 ) by setting a 0 = 0.01 and b 0 = 0.5 to encourage sparsity; doing so exaggerates the block structure in the network. We then sampled a data set y ij ∼ Pois(µ * ij ) and noised it τ ij ∼ 2Geo(α) for three increasing values of α. Since the magnitude of the counts y ij varied across trials, we allowed the three values of α to vary by setting the precision to the empirical mean of the data N :=Ê[y ij ] and setting α := exp(− /N ) for three values of ∈ {2.5, 1, 0.75}. For each model, we ran 8,500 sampling iterations, saving every 25 th sample after the first 1,000 and using these samples to computeμ ij , as given in Equation 18. In Figure 4 , we visually compare the estimates ofμ ij by our method and the naïve approach, under the three different noise levels, to the estimate by the non-private method and to the true values µ * ij . We see that the naïve Figure 5 : Inferred mean average error (MAE) between the true Enron data Y and the inferred MAP estimate of the datamu. Because the non-naïve methods tend to infer sparser mu, they often produce much lower error for entries in Y closer to zero.
approach overfits the noise, predicting high rates in sparse parts of the matrix. In contrast, our method reproduces the sparse block structure of the true prior of the data.
In cases with more added noise and a stronger privacy guarantee, our method often infers a sparser prior matrix than the true prior, as reflected in the absent top-left and bottom-right blocks in the estimatedμ ij in the = 0.75 case. Under non-private Poisson matrix factorization, the Poisson prior matrixmu ij must furnish nonzero priors for all nonzero counts in the observed data, as it is impossible to sample a non-zero count from a Poisson of prior zero. However, by augmenting model inference with independent noise, we allow an alternate explanation of nonzero observations as coming from the two-sided geometric noise in our model. It is therefore likely that our method will infer parameters of the Poisson factorization model that are much more sparse than the true data would allow. Though the interpretive structure learned by our method is much closer to the true prior than the naïve method, this affinity for sparse models can lead held-out likelihood estimates for our method to be worse than the naïve method.
Enron. We processed the Enron corpus (Klimt and Yang, 2004) to obtain a V ×V adjacency matrix Y where y ij is the number of emails sent from actor i to actor j. When an email included multiple recipients, we incremented the corresponding counts by one. We fit non-private Poisson factorization to the data Y and obtained point estimates of the factors θ * ic and π * cd . We consider three methods of inference: the Na ive method, in which we do not attempt to infer the noise distribution; the Schedule method, in which we infer noise-related variables every 100 iterations, and the Schedule+Hybrid+ICM method, in which we also apply both the Hybrid and ICM performance optimizations from Section 5. We also consider three different numbers of latent communities C ∈ {5, 10, 20}, as well as three different privacy levels specified by the ratio of the privacy budget to the limited-precision local privacy bound N , /N ∈ {3, 2, 1}. For each inference method and privacy level, we produce five different versions of the data with added two-sided geometric noise, applying the inference method to each privatized data set separately. We perform 7,500 sampling iterations total per inference trial, saving every 100 th sample after the first 2,500 to computeμ ij . In Figure 5 , we report the mean average error of the Poisson distribution's estimateμ ij of the expectation of the data with respect to the true data Y . The results show that by retaining or even exaggerating the sparsity of the inferred value ofμ, our non-naïve models have less error in estimating the true data than the naïve model.
We also present two additional evaluation metrics related to the usefulness of the learned model with respect to the true data: (bottom) . We see that our method not only does as well or better than the naïve method for predicting high-magnitude entries in the data, but also is much better at learning sparsity in the low-magnitude entries in the data. The red line represents the average predictive result when no private noise is added. Figure 7 : Results of comparing mean pairwise embedding distance for models trained across all Enron community data. As the number of communities increases, the embedding distance improves faster for our method than for the naïve method.
• held-out link prediction, in which we hold out intervals of the community data and measure the relative error between the held-out values and their MAP estimatemu; and
• pairwise embedding difference, as described in Definition 7, which measures how close two stochastic embeddings are to representing the same pairwise relationships.
In the case of pairwise embedding distance, we row-normalize our inferred θ parameter matrix to sum to one. Our evaluation averages the pairwise embedding distances between parameter matrices inferred by our methods under different levels of differentially private noise and ten different θ matrices inferred over data with no noise added using the standard Bayesian mixed-membership stochastic block model inference procedure. We first present results for held-out prediction in Figure 6 . For our held-out data, we test both holding out the interactions of the top 50 senders with the top 50 recipients by total message volume and the interactions of the bottom 50 senders with the bottom 50 recipients. We find from these results two strengths of our model: it both performs better in many cases in recovering entries with high expected activity (in the top senders/recipients case) and successfully predicts the zero entries in regions with low expected activity (in the bottom senders/recipients case). We also see encouraging results for pairwise embedding distance in Figure 7 . While the Na ive method tends quickly away from learning pairwise relationships between actors in the community similar to those learned from noiseless data, the Schedule method remains much closer to retaining those true relationships as noise increases. The more performance-optimized Schedule+Hybrid+ICM method has very similar behavior in its pairwise embedding distance to just the Schedule method.
Case study 2: Topic modeling
Topic models are in widely used in the social sciences for learning latent topics (i.e., probability distributions over some vocabulary) from text corpora, often to characterize high-level thematic structure e.g., Ramage et al. (2009) ; Grimmer and Stewart (2013) ; Mohr and Bogdanov (2013) ; Roberts et al. (2013) . In many settings, these corpora contain sensitive information about the people involved (e.g., emails, survey responses). As a result, people may be unwilling to consent to sharing their data without formal privacy guarantees, such as those provided by differential privacy.
Limited-precision local privacy. In this scenario, data set Y is a D × V count matrix, where each element y dv ∈ Z + in this matrix is the number of times word type v ∈ [V ] occurred in document d ∈ [D]. Similar to the community-detection scenario, a single observation in this data set might correspond to a single element. In this case, if y dv ≤ N , an adversary would be unable to tell fromỹ (±) dv whether v occurred in d, provided is sufficiently small. However, a more natural interpretation would be to assume that a single observation is an entire document-i.e., y d = (y d1 , . . . , y dV ). In this case, if the 1 norm of the difference between two documents is N or less, then their privatized versions will be indistinguishable, provided is sufficiently small. For example, if N = 4, then the privatized version of email that includes the sentence "I hate my boss" will be indistinguishable from that of an email without the sentence. We note that it is also natural to consider heterogeneous document-specific precision levels-i.e., N d leading to d = N d ln 1 α d -to enable the author of document d to choose how much to noise this document before sharing it. For example, if an author wanted to make sure that an adversary would be unable to tell that she wrote "surprise party" five times in an email, she would first set N d := 5 · 2 = 10. Then, to achieve d = 1, she would setỹ (±) dv := y dv + τ dv , where τ dv ∼ 2Geo(α d ) and α d = exp (− d N d ) ≈ 0.9.
Poisson factorization . As explained in Section 3, latent Dirichlet allocation (Blei et al., 2003 )-a well-known topic model for text corpora-is a special case of Poisson factorization where Y is a D × V count matrix; n = (d, v), where d ∈ [D] and v ∈ [V ]; Z = {Θ, Φ}, where Θ and Φ are D × K and K × V non-negative, real-valued matrices, respectively; and µ dv = K k=1 θ dk φ kv . The factor θ dk represents how much topic k is used in document d, while the factor φ kv represents how much word type v is used in topic k. Again, it is standard to assume independent Gamma priors over the factors-i.e., θ dk , φ kv ∼ Gamma(a 0 , b 0 ), where a 0 and b 0 are shape and rate hyperparameters, respectively. Synthetic data. We generated a synthetic data set of D = 90 documents, with K = 3 topics and V = 15 word types. We set Φ * so that the topics were well separated, with each putting the majority of its mass on five different word types. We also ensured that the documents were well separated into three equal groups of thirty, with each putting the majority of its mass on a different topic. We then sampled a data set y * dv ∼ Pois(µ * dv ) where µ * dv = K k=1 θ * dk φ * kv . We then generated a heterogeneously-noised data set by sampling the d th document's noise level α d ∼ Beta c α 0 , c (1−α 0 ) from a Beta distribution with mean α 0 and concentration parameter c = 10 and then sampling τ dv ∼ 2Geo(α d ) for each word type v. We repeated this for a small and large value of α 0 . For each model, we ran 6,000 sampling iterations, saving every 25 th sample after the first 1,000. We selectedΦ to be from the posterior sample with the highest joint probability. Note that, due to label-switching, we cannot average the samples of Φ. Following Newman et al. (2009) , we then aligned the topic indices ofΦ to Φ * using the Hungarian bipartite matching algorithm. We visualize the results in Figure 1 where we see that the naïve approach performs poorly at recovering the topics in the high noise case.
Enron sample data. We additionally tested a model trained on a random sample of D = 10, 000 Enron emails with at least 50 tokens in them sample from the full corpus of messages. We also limited the vocabulary to V = 10, 000 features, choosing the most frequent features with document frequency less than 0.3. We fit a model using K = 50 topics as the latent dimension. To compute topic evaluations such as NPMI Lau et al. (2014) and topic coherence Mimno et al. (2011) , we find the 10 most prominent word types for each topic k as those with the maximum weight for the corresponding topic vector φ k , using the noiseless data as the true reference corpus. We plot MAE and these two metrics in Figure 8 . We find that our methods have both lower error and higher coherence in both metrics than models learned na ively.
We also can verify that the topics recovered from these models are similar to those acquired from noiseless models. Table 1 shows two example topics from a model trained with no noise and the corresponding topics from each method with a privacy level of /N = 2. We see that all of the methods, naïve or not, are able to recover topics close to the topics from model trained on noiseless data.
Conclusion and future directions
We presented a general and modular method for privatizing Bayesian inference for Poisson factorization, a broad class of models that contains some of the most widely used models in the social sciences. Our method satisfies local differential privacy. To formulate our local-privacy guarantees, we introduced limited-precision local privacy-the local privacy Noiseless Topic privileged sender delete contain prohibited distribution disclosure attachments error notify Na ive privileged sender delete contain prohibited attachments distribution disclosure strictly receive Schedule privileged sender prohibited delete distribution attachments contain reply strictly disclosure Sched+Hybr+ICM sender privileged prohibited delete contain distribution attachments disclosure strictly reply Noiseless Topic prices state electricity utilities electric plant customers natural utility generation Na ive prices electricity natural electric utilities customers commission plant marketing markets Schedule customers prices state markets electricity service companies utilities electric commission Sched+Hybr+ICM state electricity prices utilities electric customers utility inc commission markets analog of limited-precision differential privacy. Finally, via two case studies, we demonstrated our method's utility over a naïve approach, wherein inference proceeds as usual, treating privatized data as if it were not privatized. The key to our method is being able to efficiently sample values of the non-privatized data. We accomplish this by introducing auxiliary variables and exploiting special relationships between the Bessel, Skellam, and Poisson distributions to obtain a sequence of closed-form conditional distributions for every variable. Our method Naïve method Non-private Figure 9 : Mean KL divergence of the Poisson distribution implied byμ dv from the Poisson distribution implied by µ * dv ; lower is better. Error bars denote standard deviation across five replications. Each subfigure reports the results across nine values of α (higher values mean more noise) for a given setting of e 0 which controls the sparsity and magnitude of the count observations. As the counts grow larger and denser, the performance of both private methods approaches the performance of non-private Poisson factorization for small values of α. Our method almost always outperforms the naïve approach, with the difference being especially stark at higher noise levels. With fixed paramters, the Skellam distribution can be asymmetric and centered at a value other than zero; however, the two-sided geometric distribution is symmetric and centered at zero. It is also heavy tailed and the discrete analog of the Laplace distribution.
Appendix B. Geometric mechanism
Theorem 4 If N is a positive integer and randomized response method R(·) is the geometric mechanism with parameter α, then for any pair of observations y, y ∈ Y ⊆ Z d such that y − y 1 ≤ N , R(·) satisfies P (R(y) ∈ S) ≤ e P R(y ) ∈ S
for all subsets S in the range of R(·), where = N ln 1 α .
Proof It suffices to show that for any integer-valued vector o ∈ Z d , the following inequality holds for any pair of observations y, y ∈ Y ⊆ Z d such that y − y 1 ≤ N : 
By the triangle inequality, we also know that for each i, −|y i − y i | ≤ |o i − y i | − |o i − y i | ≤ |y i − y i |.
Therefore,
It follows that
If = N ln 1 α , then we recover the bound in equation 22.
Appendix C. Two-sided geometric noise as exponentially randomized Skellam noise
Theorem 5 A two-sided geometric random variable τ ∼ 2Geo(α) can be generated as follows: λ (+) , λ (−) ∼ Exp( α 1−α ), τ ∼ Skel(λ (+) , λ (−) ),
Proof A two-sided geometric random variable τ ∼ 2Geo(α) can be generated by taking the difference of two independent and identically distributed geometric random variables: 3 g (+) ∼ Geo(α), g (−) ∼ Geo(α), τ := g (+) − g (−) .
The geometric distribution is a special case of the negative binomial distribution, with shape parameter equal to one (Johnson et al., 2005) . Furthermore, the negative binomial distribution can be represented as a mixture of Poisson distributions with a gamma mixing distribution. We can therefore re-express equation 30 as follows:
λ (+) ∼ Gam(1, α 1−α ), λ (−) ∼ Gam(1, α 1−α ), g (+) ∼ Pois(λ (+) ), g (−) ∼ Pois(λ (−) ), τ := g (+) −g (−) .
(31) Finally, a gamma distribution with shape parameter equal to one is an exponential distribution, while the difference of two independent Poisson random variables is marginally a Skellam random variable (Skellam, 1946) .
Appendix D. Relationship between the Bessel and Skellam distributions
Theorem 6 Consider two Poisson random variables y 1 ∼ Pois(λ (+) ) and y 2 ∼ Pois(λ (−) ). Their minimum m := min{y 1 , y 2 } and their difference δ := y 1 −y 2 are deterministic functions of y 1 and y 2 . However, if not conditioned on y 1 and y 2 , the random variables m and δ can be marginally generated as follows:
δ ∼ Skel(λ (+) , λ (−) ), m ∼ Bes |δ|, 2 2λ (+) λ (−) .
Proof P (y 1 , y 2 ) = Pois(y 1 ; λ (+) ) Pois(y 2 ; λ (−) ) (33) = (λ (+) ) y 1 y 1 ! e −λ (+) (λ (−) ) y 2 y 2 ! e −λ (−)
= ( √ λ (+) λ (−) ) y 1 +y 2 y 1 ! y 2 ! e −(λ (+) +λ (−) ) λ (+) λ (−) (y 1 −y 2 ) / 2 .
3. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V1EyqL1cqTE.
If y 1 ≥ y 2 , then P (y 1 , y 2 ) = ( √ λ (+) λ (−) ) y 1 +y 2 I y 1 −y 2 (2 √ λ (+) λ (−) ) y 1 ! y 2 ! e −(λ (+) +λ (−) ) λ (+) λ (−) (y 1 −y 2 ) / 2 I y 1 −y 2 (2 λ (+) λ (−) ) (36) = Bes y 2 ; y 1 − y 2 , 2 λ (+) λ (−) Skel(y 1 − y 2 ; λ (+) , λ (−) );
otherwise P (y 1 , y 2 ) = ( √ λ (+) λ (−) ) y 1 +y 2 I y 2 −y 1 (2 √ λ (+) λ (−) ) y 1 ! y 2 ! e −(λ (+) +λ (−) ) λ (−) λ (+) (y 2 −y 1 ) / 2 I y 2 −y 1 (2 λ (+) λ (−) ) (38) = Bes y 1 ; y 2 − y 1 , 2 λ (+) λ (−) Skel(y 2 − y 1 ; λ (−) , λ (+) ) = Bes y 1 ; −(y 1 − y 2 ), 2 λ (+) λ (−) Skel(y 1 − y 2 ; λ (+) , λ (−) ).
If m := min{y 1 , y 2 }, δ := y 1 − y 2 , 
so P (m, δ) = P (y 1 , y 2 ) ∂y 1 ∂m ∂y 1 ∂δ ∂y 2 ∂m ∂y 2 ∂δ = Bes m; |δ|, 2 λ (+) λ (−) Skel(δ; λ (+) , λ (−) ).
